The following material is flagged Green Level. It is intended to reflect material that the author believes to be a matter of consensus among experts in the field. This belief may be incorrect, however; and as the author is not an expert and does not have an expert fact-checking the article, errors may creep in.So far, we have only looked at games that happen in one turn. But the world does not work that way. We rarely ever meet someone just once. What someone may think of us in the future must be taken into consideration, as must what someone has already done to us.
Let us explore what happens when we run through the Prisoner's Dilemma again and again.
First, when playing an iterated game, it is possible to change one's strategies in response to what one's opponent has done on the last round. For instance, if I have a tendency to make a particular move, you might adjust your moves to cope with that.
But for our understanding of how a game works to make sense, we should define rules for how we will change our strategies. A few possible ways of handling the Prisoner's Dilemma are listed below:
- Altruistic: Always cooperate.
- Sociopathic: Always defect.
- Tit-For-Tat: Start with cooperate, afterward repeat opponent's last move.
- Cynical Tit-For-Tat: Start with defect, afterward repeat opponent's last move.
- Grim Trigger: Cooperate until opponent defects, always defect afterward.
Also, this time around we will be using a general version of the Prisoner's Dilemma:
Cooperate | Defect | |
| Cooperate | (A,A) | (E,B) |
| Defect | (B,E) | (F, F) |
and 2A>B+E (this is in place to ensure that two mutual cooperations are better than exchanging between cooperation and defection)
First pass:
| Altruistic | Sociopathic | Tit-For-Tat | Cynical Tit-For-Tat | Grim Trigger | |
| Altruistic | C,C (A) | D,C (B) | C,C (A) | D,C (B) | C,C (A) |
| Sociopathic | C,D (E) | D,D (F) | C,D (E) | D,D (F) | C,D (E) |
| Tit-For-Tat | C,C (A) | D,C (B) | C,C (A) | D,C (B) | C,C (A) |
| Cynical Tit-For-Tat | C,D (E) | D,D (F) | C,D (E) | D,D (F) | C,D (E) |
| Grim Trigger | C,C (A) | D,C (B) | C,C (A) | D,C (B) | C,C (A) |
| Totals: | 3A+2E | 3B+2F | 3A+2E | 3B+2F | 3A+2E |
| Altruistic | Sociopathic | Tit-For-Tat | Cynical Tit-For-Tat | Grim Trigger | |
| Altruistic | C,C (2A) | D,C (2B) | C,C (2A) | C,C (B+A) | C,C (2A) |
| Sociopathic | C,D (2E) | D,D (2F) | D,D (E+F) | D,D (2F) | D,D (E+F) |
| Tit-For-Tat | C,C (2A) | D,D (B+F) | C,C (2A) | C,D (B+E) | C,C (2A) |
| Cynical Tit-For-Tat | C,C (2E) | D,D (2F) | D,C (B+E) | D,D (2F) | D,C (B+E) |
| Grim Trigger | C,C (2A) | D,D (B+F) | C,C (2A) | C,D (B+E) | C,C (2A) |
| Totals: | 6A+4E | 8F+2B | 6A+B+2E+F | A+3B+2E+4F | 6A+B+2E+F |
| Altruistic | Sociopathic | Tit-For-Tat | Cynical Tit-For-Tat | Grim Trigger | |
| Altruistic | C,C (3A) | D,C (3B) | C,C (3A) | C,C (B+2A) | C,C (3A) |
| Sociopathic | C,D (3E) | D,D (3F) | D,D (E+2F) | D,D (3F) | D,D (E+2F) |
| Tit-For-Tat | C,C (3A) | D,D (B+2F) | C,C (3A) | D,C (2B+E) | C,C (3A) |
| Cynical Tit-For-Tat | C,C (3E) | D,D (3F) | C,D (B+2E) | D,D (3F) | D,D (B+E+F) |
| Grim Trigger | C,C (3A) | D,D (B+2F) | C,C (3A) | D,D (B+E+F) | C,C (3A) |
| Totals: | 9A+6E | 5B+10F | 9A+B+3E+2F | 2A+4B+2E+7F | 9A+B+2E+3F |
| Altruistic | Sociopathic | Tit-For-Tat | Cynical Tit-For-Tat | Grim Trigger | |
| Altruistic | C,C (4A) | D,C (4B) | C,C (4A) | C,C (B+3A) | C,C (4A) |
| Sociopathic | C,D (4E) | D,D (4F) | D,D (E+3F) | D,D (4F) | D,D (E+3F) |
| Tit-For-Tat | C,C (4A) | D,D (B+3F) | C,C (4A) | C,D (2B+2E) | C,C (4A) |
| Cynical Tit-For-Tat | C,C (4E) | D,D (4F) | D,C (2B+2E) | D,D (4F) | D,D (B+E+2F) |
| Grim Trigger | C,C (4A) | D,D (B+3F) | C,C (4A) | D,D (B+E+2F) | C,C (4A) |
| Totals: | 12A+8E | 6B+14F | 12A+2B+3E+3F | 3A+4B+3E+10F | 12A+B+2E+5F |
| Altruistic | Sociopathic | Tit-For-Tat | Cynical Tit-For-Tat | Grim Trigger | |
| Altruistic | C,C (XA) | D,C (XB) | C,C (XA) | C,C (B+[X-1]A) | C,C (XA) |
| Sociopathic | C,D (XE) | D,D (XF) | D,D (E+[X-1]F) | D,D (XF) | D,D (E+[X-1]F) |
| Tit-For-Tat | C,C (XA) | D,D (B+[X-1]F) | C,C (XA) | C,D/D,C ([X/2]B+[X/2]E) | C,C (XA) |
| Cynical Tit-For-Tat | C,C (XE) | D,D (XF) | D,C/C,D ([X/2]B+[X/2]E) | D,D (XF) | D,D (B+E+[X-2]F) |
| Grim Trigger | C,C (XA) | D,D (B+[X-1]F) | C,C (XA) | D,D (B+E+[X-2]F) | C,C (XA) |
| Totals: | 3XA+ 2XE | [2X+2]B+ [3X-2]F | 3XA+ [X/2]B+ [X/2+1]E+ [X-1]F | [X-1]A+ [X/2+2]B+ [X/2+1]E+ [3X-2]F | 3XA+ B+ 2E+ [2X-3]F |
- (2X+2)B+(3X-2)F ? 3XA+(X/2)B+(X/2+1)E+(X-1)F
- 2XB+2B+3XF-2F ? 3XA+XB/2+XE/2+E+XF-F
- 2XB+2B+3XF-2F ? 3XG-XB-XE+E+XF-F(substitute B+E+G for A, where G=[2A-B-E]/2)
- 3XB+2B+XE-E+2XF-F ? 3XG
- (B-E)+(B-F)+X(B+E)+2X(B+F) ? 3XG
- (B-E)+(B-F) ? X(3G-3B-E-2F)
If you like, you can check Tit-For-Tat against other strategies. You can also try putting together something that beats the strategies I gave you.
Next time, a problem with this solution.
<<Non-Zero-Sum Games: The Simple Prisoner's Dilemma | Game Theory | Cyclic Games: The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma II: (Electric Boogaloo:) The End of the Game>>
I'm afraid to comment because you may have covered my question in a later post that I haven't read yet.
ReplyDeleteAh, what the hell. My question: You mentioned in a previous post that a game has a value, basically based on the rational choices that each player would make, taking into account expected value. Does value take into account the sort of predictive decision making that you talked about? And does prediction of the other player always cause an infinite chain of decision changing, or are there non-trivial zero-sum games where a prediction chain would lead to a final outcome?
Sort of. The value of an outcome to a player is determined by looking at what that player has after that outcome (in terms of things like money, possessions, time, and so forth), figuring out how much each is worth, and adding them up. The value of a game is based on what happens if you state the outcomes of the game in terms of the values of its outcomes, and then figure out what happens. And yes, if you bring things like empathy into the game and make each player's utility function partly dependent on the other's, you can get an infinite series.
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